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PUBLIC ISSUES IN A PRIVATE LAW
WORLD: THE APPOINTMENT OF A
RECEIVER AS A CASE STUDY*
By

WILLIAM

E.

CONKLIN** AND JODI

J. MORRISON***

This essay aims to bypass the doctrine/policy approach to contemporary legal
analysis. Instead of resting content with an elaboration of legal doctrine, the
authors incorporate social and economic evidence surrounding the call of a demand
loan. This evidence creates an understanding of the practice of receivership law;
a practice which legal doctrine inadequately describes. Secondly, instead of being
content with an assertion of policy, the authors attempt to understand the practice
by assessing the evidence in the light of the Greek forms of corrective justice and
distributive justice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few Canadian businesses exist for any length of time without
the need for bank fimancing.' Implicit in the decision to provide
I W. Grover & D. Ross, Materials on CorporateFinance (Toronto: Richard DeBoo,
1975) at 119. Indeed, bank financing is so much a part of current corporate law practice that
the organizational proceedings of virtually every newly incorporated company provide for
appropriate borrowing by-laws and banking resolutions in a form provided by the bank. P.
Papadopoulos, 'Economic Role of our Banks" (1980) 87 Can. Banker & ICB Rev. 20 at 22.
without citing authority, Peter Newman suggests that the chartered banks have in excess of
$40 billion in loans at any time. See P. Newman, The CanadianEstablishment,vol. 1 (revised
and updated; Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1979) at 96.
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financing is the expectation on the part of the financial institution
that it will be repaid in the ordinary course of business. However,
should the need arise, a financial institution is generally well
prepared to coerce repayment through the exercise of its rights as
a secured creditor, particularly through the appointment of a
receiver/manager. The authority of the financial institution to
appoint a receiver typically derives from the terms of a demand
debenture, signed by the borrower, permitting such appointment in
the event that the borrower does not repay the loan upon demand.
While a receiver may be appointed and supervised by the court
(which seems to be the normal practice in British Columbia), the
normal practice in Ontario is for the receiver to be appointed
privately by the secured creditor pursuant to the terms of the
debenture. Once appointed, the receiver administers or manages
the business for the purpose of selling the debtor's assets in order
to repay the secured creditor.
Few lawyers would disagree that the appointment of a
receiver and the overriding contract exemplify the lawyer's intuitive
notion of private law. Why it is considered private law is not our
immediate concern. But, upon labelling an area of law as private,
as opposed to public, the lawyer intuitively considers the private law
rules as immune from social or public scrutiny except via an excursus
into the world of policy. Policy, in turn, is considered outside of the
"real" law in an "ought" world of political values. Rules constitute
reality. Policy goes to an "ought" world. When faced with the claim
that public issues really do exist in the private law world, the lawyer
naturally reacts that the parties have chosen to limit their general
right to be free by signing the contract. That contract identifies
conditions that, in turn, define harm. There is undoubtedly a public
element to the private contract. When lawyers or courts construe
its terms, for example, they sometimes appeal to "public policy."
When a court appoints a receiver, the receiver takes on the role of
a "public officer." But for some mysterious reason, no doubt lying
deep within our legal consciousness, the lawyer retains his or her
label of the area as "private law." By signing the contract, the
parties agree to incorporate the "real" world of legal rules and to
exclude "policy" or "ought" considerations. To consider public issues
in the "private law" area would trigger the "ought" policy world. Or,
so the lawyer has assumed to be the case.
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This paper aims to demonstrate how one can identify the
public issues in this private law world by by-passing the rule/policy
distinction.2 Instead of focusing upon a "rules-oriented" examination
of the law, we use judicial decisions and the resultant legal rules as
a supplement to a far wider context grounded in Aristotle's "forms
of justice."3 We shall identify the issues of justice without resolving
them, leaving the latter for another day.
We consciously use the word "justice," not policy. The term
"policy," again, ushers forth connotations of preference, prejudice,
ideals, values, and unsubstantiated opinion in an "ought," subjective
political world that law schools used to teach us to leave to the
legislature. If we wish to criticize the rules, we are led, of necessity,
into the legislature's world of preference - or, so the rules/policy
orientation leads us to believe. We claim that this rule/policy
conundrum falsely describes the alternatives actually available in
legal analysis. Accordingly, we use the judicially created rules only
to supplement more diversified resource material which can better
inform us of the actual practice of the actors. More importantly,
drawing from the eminent scholarship of Ernest Weinrib,4
Christopher Arnold,5 Kent Greenawalt, 6 and John Finnis,7 we
replace the rules/policy dichotomy with the far richer tradition of the
forms of justice. We wish to demonstrate how the "forms of justice"
can help us better identify the public issues in the private law world.
2 Why it is critical for lawyers to by-pass the rule/policy conception of law is explained
in W.E. Conklin, "Te Legal Theory of Horkheimer and Adorno" (1986) 5 Windsor Y.B.

Access Just. 230.
3 See generally, Aristotle, Ethics, book V and Politics, 1280-1284b.

4 E. Weinrib, 'Liberty, Community and Corrective Justice' (1988) 1 Can. L. & Juris. 3;
"Legal Formalisi" (1988) Yale LJ. 949; "lheInsurance Justification and Private Law' (1985)
14 J. Leg. Stud. 681; "The Intelligibility of the Rule of Law" in A. Hutchinson & Patrick
Monahan, eds, The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideolog,? (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 59 at 59-84;
'Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law" (1983) 2 J. L. & Phil'y 37.
5 C. Arnold, "Corrective Justice" (1980) 90 Ethics 180.
6

K. Greenawalt, DiscriminationandReverse Discrbination(New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1983) c. 8, 9.
7 J. Finnis, Natural Law and NaturalRights (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1982) c. 7.
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HI. CURRENT DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF
RECEIVERSHIP

A. General
Traditional legal analysis in the common law jurisdictions of
Canada begins with judicial decisions and statutes as the basic
resource material and focal point of examination. Let us take this
familiar route for the moment.
As with any discussion of
contractual rights, one should begin with the terms of the
agreement. In particular, when considering the terms of a demand
debenture, one should take into account primarily the promise to
pay provision, the enumerated events of default, and the contractual
rights of the secured creditor upon default.
In the typical promise-to-pay clause, the borrower promises
to pay, "on demand," a stated sum of money together with interest
at a specified rate. A common variation of the basic covenant
provides that the borrower promises to pay, on demand, the
principal sum plus interest "on presentation and surrender" of the
debenture at a specified place (usually a particular branch of the
bank). The debenture then sets out the events of default upon the
happening of which the security becomes enforceable. Invariably a
default in the payment of principal or interest under the terms of
the debenture will trigger default. The debenture will often identify
other conditions that will trigger default: bankruptcy; insolvency;
winding-up or liquidation of the corporation; breach of a condition
contained in the debenture; the levy of execution or similar process
against the assets of the borrower; or the occurrence of a material
and adverse change in the financial position of the borrower. The
debenture will ordinarily provide that, in addition to certain other
remedies, the secured creditor may appoint a receiver once the
security becomes enforceable.
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B. Default and the "ReasonableTime" Requirement
It is the occurrence of an event of default that renders the
security enforceable; and once the security becomes enforceable, it
authorizes the appointment of a receiver. In the absence of an
event of default, the security does not become enforceable.
Accordingly, any appointment of a receiver is unlawful, thereby
subjecting the receiver to liability for trespass and conversion. For
the purposes of the present discussion it is convenient to deal with
the existence of default under two headings: (a) default in payment
after a valid demand therefor has been made; and (b) occurrence of
one of the other events of default noted above.
1. Default in payment after demand
Assuming that a demand has been made that satisfies the
express requirements contained in the debenture and that it is
therefore technically effective,8 it is now quite clear that the
borrowing corporation must be afforded a reasonable time within
which to meet that demand. The reasonable time doctrine seems to
have taken its initial foothold with the following comment in the
trial decision in Ronald Elwyn Lister Ltd v. Dunlop Canada Ltd:
[WI]here money is payable on demand, the debtor is entitled to a reasonable time
to meet the demand, the question of what is reasonable being a question of fact to
be determined in the circumstances of the particular case.9

At the Court of Appeal the reasonable time doctrine received
approval in the following terms:

8 For an example of a case in which a demand was rendered invalid as a result of a
failure of the bank to present the debenture in accordance with its terms, see Royal Bank of
Canada v. Cal Glass Ltd (1979), 18 B.C.LR. 55, 9 B.LR. I (S.C.), aft'd 22 B.C.LR. 328
(CA). See also SeawaterProducts (NJId.) Limited v. Royal Bank of Canada (1980), 36 C.B.R.
(N.S.) 21, in which the debenture was presented for payment, as required by the debenture,
but not at the location stipulated.

9 (1978), 28 C.B.R. (N.S.) 128 [hereinafter Lister].
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The law is clear that a debtor must be given a reasonable time to meet a demand
for payment before a creditor may enforce his security. What is a reasonable time
depends upon the terms of the security agreement and the circumstances of the
case. 1

Although the doctrine thus received appellate approval, it did so
with one significant modification: a reasonable time was only to be
afforded to those who had the good fortune, good sense, or good
advice to request it:
Since the company could not meet Dunlop's demand for payment of 20th March,
I think it was incumbent on Lister to say, "Hold on, I will find the money and lend
it to the company." Instead, he emphasized that the Autopar stock did not belong
to the company and should not be seized by the receiver. In these circumstances
I think that Dunlop was not required to give time to the company to borrow money
with which to pay up the indebtedness, unless time had been asked for, and it was
not./

Prior to both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court
of Canada decisions in Lister, the issue again came before the
Ontario High Court in Mister Broadloom Coiporation (1968) Ltd v.
Bank of Montreal12 It is important to quote from this case at some
length. Mr. Justice Linden takes the opportunity to inject the
calling of demand bank loans and the enforcement of security with
an atmosphere of reasonableness:
When money is "payable on demand;' what does this mean? Does it mean that the
money must be paid immediately, or does it mean that it must be paid within a
reasonable time thereafter? Clearly, the debtor does not have the right in every
case to get as much time as he needs to see if he can raise the money ... If he did,
a demand note would be useless. But neither can a creditor expect the debtor to
have the money ready in his pocket to hand over instantly, especially if a large sum
is involved. Even the strictest of the old cases permits the debtor enough time to
go and get the money from his desk or from his bank... Between these two poles,
it is not easy to determine how much time a debtor has to pay the money when it
is demanded. It is clear that it need not be paid instantaneously. It is also clear
the debtor cannot pay it at his leisure. A reasonable time always had to be given,
and what is a reasonable time has always depended on the circumstances... More
recently our courts appear to have extended the time allowed, in appropriate cases,

10 (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 4 at 16.
11 bd at 19.
12 (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 198, 7 B.L.R. 222, 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 241 (H.C.".). [hereinafter
Mister Broadloom cited to C.B.R.].
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to "at least a few days in which to meet the demand".... The reason for this may
be the increasing complexity of arranging for the payment of large sums o money
today and the additional time now required to do so. This does not mean, of
course, that a debtor is entitled as a matter of right in every demand situation to
a few days to meet the demand. As is so often the case, the amount of time that
will be allowed will depend on the individual circumstances of each situation.1 3

One should note that, at least in part because the debtor neither
requested time nor made adequate proposals for payment, Linden J.
ultimately came to the conclusion that the forty to fifty minutes
afforded to the debtor to meet an unexpected demand for payment
of $1,500,000 was a reasonable time.
At the Supreme Court of Canada in Lister,'4 the doctrine of
reasonable notice was reaffirmed, with some modification and some
elaboration. Mr. Justice Estey made it quite clear that not only is
the debtor entitled to a reasonable time to meet a demand for
payment, but that such notice must not be illusory: the debtor is
entitled to such notice as will afford it a reasonable opportunity to
act, although precisely what constitutes such notice in any particular
case will depend upon all the facts and circumstances.1 5 Further,
the appellants were entitled to such notice notwithstanding their
failure to request time to pay: "[t]his technical or mechanical
acquiescence in no way eliminated, by waiver, acquiescence
or
16
notice."
reasonable
to
entitlement
appellants'
the
otherwise,
The hearing of the appeal in Mister Broadloom17 was
delayed, awaiting the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Lister.
The Ontario Court of Appeal then took the opportunity to restate
the principles enunciated in Listerby the Supreme Court of Canada,
thus recanting its earlier opinion that the debtor must ask for time
to pay when the demand is made.

13

bd. at 251-52 of CB.R.

14 (1982), 135 D.LR. (3d) 1, 41 C.B.R. (N.S.) 272.
15

bid at 288 of C.B.R.

16

Ibid at 289 of C.B.RL

17 (1983), 49 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
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While Lister and Mister Broadloom have been the two cases
primarily associated with the reasonable time doctrine, other cases
have begun to expand on the basic proposition. For example, in
Four-K Western Equipment Ltd v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerces1 8 it was held that the right to a reasonable time could be
waived, for "[t]o hold that reasonable notice could not be waived
would be impractical to business. "19 In Bank of Montreal v.
Petronech,20 it was held that even though a failure to grant a
reasonable time to pay after a demand from the principal debtor
may relieve a guarantor of his or her obligations, the guarantor may
contract out of such rights. Several other cases dealing with the
notion of a reasonable time, referred to below, assist only to the
extent they provide insight into the application of the doctrine
within the particular factual context.
On the basis of the foregoing we may conclude that,
notwithstanding the fact that a debenture, by its express terms, is
payable "on demand," the debtor is entitled to a reasonable time
after demand within which to pay. Although a reasonable time must
be afforded to the debtor whether or not it is requested, the right
is capable of being waived by the debtor. The time permitted to the
debtor is such that it must be sufficient to afford him a reasonable
opportunity to act and must not be merely illusory. Finally, precisely
what constitutes reasonable time is a matter to be determined upon
all the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
18 (1983), 46 C.B.R. (N.S.) 146 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Four-IKJ.
19 TBid, at 161. See also, Continental Bank of Canada v. Maple Leaf Helicopters Ltd
(1983), 50 C.B.R. (N.S.) 265 (B.C.S.C.), in which the appointment of a receiver was held to
be valid, at least in part, because the actions were taken with the consent of the debtor.
However, see Moase ProduceLimited v. Royal Bank of Canada (1986), 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 300
(P.E.I. S.C.) where, at page 308, it was said that "the right to reasonable time to pay should
not easily be taken as having been waived." An acknowledgement, signed by the debtor, was
held not to constitute an effective waiver because the bank had prepared the document, it
contained false and nonsensical statements, and the company received no consideration for
signing it.
20 (1984), 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 17 (Aita. Q.B.) [hereinafter Petronech]. See also, Nobes v.
Royal Bank of Canada (1982), 16 B.L.R. 289 (N.S.S.C. App. Div.). In this case Macdonald
JA stated, at 301, that "even assuming lack of demand, improper notice and resulting
wrongful entry the learned trial Judge has found, and I agree, that there was not, under the
circumstances, any prejudice caused the sureties.'
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2. Other events of default
The typical debenture may include a long list of events of
default in addition to the failure to pay principal or 'nterest. As a
consequence, the question arises whether the debtor is entitled to a
reasonable time to pay, after a demand, if the secured creditor relies
upon an event of default other than a failure to pay. For example,
if a lender seeks to rely upon the insolvency of a corporate
borrower or upon some other condition of the debenture (such as
a failure to maintain the required financial ratios), must the lender
then make a demand for payment and afford the debtor a
reasonable time to pay or, alternatively, may the lender simply
proceed to enforce its security without further formality? In order
to answer this issue, it is suggested that the nature of the reasonable
time requirement itself need be considered. More particularly, "is
the requirement a condition precedent to enforcement or
alternatively a substantive constituent element of default itself?."
That is, "is it substantive, going to the question whether or not a
default has occurred in the first instance?" Or, alternatively, "is the
reasonable time requirement a procedural matter, going rather to
the method that a secured creditor must adopt when seeking to
enforce its security?" Phrased slightly differently: "What issue is
determined by an application of the reasonable time doctrine? Does
it resolve the question of whether or not default has occurred, such
that there is no default until a reasonable time elapses after
demand; or does it resolve the question of whether, after default,
the secured creditor has proceeded in a procedurally fair manner in
the enforcement of its security?"
If the former interpretation is correct and the requirement
constitutes a substantive element of default (that is, that there is no
default until the expiration of a reasonable time after demand), then
one may legitimately conclude that the reasonable time requirement
ought not to be extended to the other events of default. If there
is no default until after both demand and lapse of a reasonable
time, the creditor is then entitled to proceed to enforce its security
immediately after default has occurred. By inference, there would
appear to be no legitimate basis upon which the requirements of
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demand and reasonable time could then be imposed on the other
events of default. That is, if the reasonable time requirement is
indeed a substantive element of default rather than a procedural
condition of enforcement, the secured creditor could proceed to
enforce its security immediately.
In contrast, an application of the alternative theory leads to
a much different result. If the essential nature of the reasonable
time requirement is procedural rather than substantive, then there
is a default rendering the security enforceable upon demand and
failure to pay. At that point, the reasonable time requirement
ensures that the secured creditor proceeds to enforce its security in
a fair manner. On this interpretation, it ought not to matter why
the security' becomes enforceable; it might become enforceable due
to a failure to pay or some other event of default. The security
having become enforceable, the secured creditor is simply
constrained in the manner in which it may exercise its rights.
Although the courts may not have analyzed the issue in quite
this way, some judicial support can be found for both
interpretations. In Seawater Products (Nfld.) Limited v. Royal Bank
of Canada, Goodridge J. indicated that he "would not consider that
there was a default in respect of the demand for payment of the
principal sum because, if for no other reason, no reasonable time
was given within which to meet the demand."21 In the trial decision
in Lister; Rutherford J. had come to the same conclusion. In his
opinion, although the demand for payment did render the amount
under the debenture due and payable, it did not, of itself, render
the security enforceable, unless the debtor had failed to pay in
accordance with the demand and unless the debtor had a reasonable
time within which to do sot 2 Rutherford J. concluded that the
"plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable time to comply with Dunlop's
demand under the debenture before the security became enforceable
and, unless the security was enforceable, there was no authority to

21 (1980), 36 C.B.R. (N.S.) 21 at 34 [hereinafter Seawater Products].
22

Supra, note 9 at 154.
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appoint a receiver..... 2 3 Thus, without reasonable time to pay, there
had been no default. 24
On the other hand, while there is this support for the
position that the reasonable time requirement is a substantive
element of default, going to the question of whether an event of
default has occurred, the weight of authority seems to be to the
contrary. In the Lister case itself, both the Court of Appeal and the
Supreme Court of Canada differed with Mr. Justice Rutherford on
this issue. It is in the judgment of Weatherston S.A. that we begin
to find a willingness to separate the contractual notions of default
and enforceability from the actual ability of the secured creditor to
proceed to enforce its security. Weatherston S.A. concluded that
[i]t may well be that the security became enforceable when default occurred, but
that does not answer the question how soon Dunlop could move to enforce the
security.... I think that the terms of s. 6.1 [the events of default contained in the
debenture] should be construed as meaning that, although the security became
enforceable, it would not be enforced until 25
the debtor had been given a reasonable
time to make payment of the amount due.

Speaking for the Supreme Court of Canada, Estey J. was of
the same opinion. In his judgment, there was no doubt that an
event of default had occurred and that the security had become
enforceable. The only issue respecting the enforcement of the
debenture was that the holder "adopted a wrongful procedure in
[the] enforcement proceedings in that no reasonable time was
afforded the company to pay up the moneys secured by the
debenture."2 6 Clearly, Estey . characterized the reasonable time
requirement as purely one of procedure.
Accordingly, the

23

id. at 155.

24 See also Mhonnock IndustriesLtd v. NationalBank of Canada (1986), 61 C.B.R. 1 at
32. In this case it was held, at page 42, that since the notice was unreasonably short, "[ilt
follows that Can.Am was not in default of the debenture ... when the notice expired, and as
there was no other default alleged under the debenture, the defendant had no right to appoint
a receiver."
25

Supra, note 10 at 18.

26 Supra, note 14 at 6 of D.LR., 278 of C.B.R.

Public Issues in Private Law

19881

requirement may operate irrespective of the nature of the default
relied upon by the secured creditor.
In Skyrotors v. Bank of Montreal,27 Osborne J. adopted the
distinction noted by Weatherston JA. in Lister. The right to
appoint a receiver, one of the first steps in the enforcement of
security, only arises when the security becomes enforceable. That
right, in turn, is triggered by the occurrence of an event of default.
However, Osborne 3. made it clear that "[t]he creditor's right to
regard the security as enforceable
is not be equated to a right to
28
actually enforce the security.'
And again, Fawcus 3. emphasized the importance of
procedural justice in all cases in Royal Bank of Canadav. Cal Glass

Ltd 29 In that case Fawcus 3. said:
Mr. Molson submitted that where a breach, of condition 5(c) occurs [the Company
becomes insolvent], then no demand for payment need be made by the plaintiff and
therefore that no time, reasonable or otherwise, need be given. However, I agree
with the submission of Mr. Hungerford that regardless of the nature of the breach,
a demand for payment must always be made. That being so, in my view a
30
reasonable time must then be given to the borrower to meet the demand.

Notwithstanding the trial court judgments in Seawater and
Lister, the only logical conclusion is that the reasonable time
requirement goes to the procedure of enforcement, and is not a
constituent element of default.
The courts generated the
requirement out of a judicial desire to ensure procedural justice in
the enforcement of security interests. This becomes clear when one
27 (1980), 34 C.B.R. (N.S.) 238 (Ont. S.C.) [hereinafter Skyrotors].
28/ bmd at 242.
29 (1979), 18 B.C.LR. 55 at 68, 9 B.L.R. 1 at 18 (S.C.), aff'd 22 B.CL.R. 328 (CA).
[hereinafter Cal Glass cited to B.L.R.].
30

bla See, also, Moase ProduceLtd v. Royal Bank of Canada,supra,note 19, in which
it was held that the creditor must grant the debtor a reasonable time within which to pay,
after a demand for payment has been made, even when the default consists of the insolvency
of the debtor. In CanadianImperial Bank of Commerce v. Quesnel Machineiy Ltd (1985) 39
A.C.W.S. (2d) 28 (B.C.S.C.), default consisted of the breach of three terms of the debenture:
(1) permitting operating loans to exceed 100% of assigned accounts receivable; (2) permitting
operating loans to exceed 50% of assigned accounts receivable in inventory, and (3) failure
to maintain the required net worth. Default having been established, the court continued to
consider whether the bank had given sufficient notice of the appointment of the receiver.
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looks to the rationale for the requirement as enunciated in the
cases. Its basis, according to Osborne 3. is "to enable the debtor to
redeem its security, and to avoid the stigma and consequences of the
imposition of a precipitous receivership. 31 Similarly, in the view of
Davies J., the reasonable notice requirement is "to protect a debtor
from unannounced, precipitous action of a creditor."32 If this is
indeed the purpose of the reasonable time requirement, as it most
certainly must be, then surely the debtor ought to be entitled to the
protection provided by the principle irrespective of the nature of the
default upon which the creditor relies. Accordingly, the creditor is
not prevented from enforcing its security because there has been no
default, or because there has been no valid demand for payment
(reasonable time not having transpired). Rather, the creditor is
prevented from enforcing its security simply because it ought not to
be permitted to do so until the debtor has had a reasonable
opportunity to avoid the catastrophic consequences of default.
The necessity of making a demand for payment and the
necessity of extending a reasonable time within which to make
One
payment are obviously related issues, though separate.
commentator has argued in favour of the necessity of making a
demand for payment (and presumably, therefore, the necessity of
extending a reasonable time within which to make payment) on the
basis that it "makes eminently good sense" and that it "[c]ertainly is
not in the best interest of borrowers to allow lenders to move
without warning.'"3 Of course, as pointed out by Osborne . in
Skyrotom, "[lit is not the demand to pay as such that is significant.
What is significant is the time extended to the d~btor before action
is taken to enforce the security. ' 34 The requirement of "notice" is
an essential part of the entire notion of procedural justice. The
reasonable time requirement, the very purpose of which is to permit

31 Supra, note 27 at 242.
32

Supra, note 18 at 161.

33 D.R. Johnson, 'The Enforcement of Demand Debentures" (1981-82) 6 C.B.LJ. 153
at 167-68.
34

Supra, note 27 at 242.
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the debtor to avoid the consequences of default, would be rendered
useless and absurd if the creditor did not have to make the debtor
aware of default and, more importantly, of the creditor's intention
to exercise its rights. If a secured creditor, by a concealed and
purely intellectual exercise, were permitted to wait a reasonable time
and then proceed, unannounced, to enforce its security, the very
rationale for the requirement would be defeated. To realize the
procedural justice intended by the reasonable time requirement, the
debtor must be put on notice. While the notice may very well
consist of a demand under the terms of the debenture, as pointed
out by Osborne J., the demand is not particularly significant in and
of itself.35 Rather, it is significant only to the extent that it renders
the reasonable time requirement meaningful.
It has been suggested that "[t]his area of the law is in a state
of unsatisfactory uncertainty. '36 We suggest that the uncertainty will
vanish once it is realized that the reasonable time doctrine is a
purely justice-generated requirement, designed to ensure that the
debtor is treated in a procedurally fair fashion. The creditor's
actions are circumscribed simply because it is just that they be so;
the creditor simply ought not to be permitted to enforce its security
without first affording the debtor a reasonable opportunity to avoid
the consequences of his or her default. The requirement thus being
procedural rather than substantive in nature, it becomes clear that
the debtor ought to be equally entitled to the protection of the
doctrine whether the default consists of a failure to pay or some
other event of default enumerated in the debenture. In either case,
procedural justice demands that the debtor be put upon notice (by
demand or otherwise) that the creditor intends to proceed to
enforce its security if payment is not forthcoming within a
reasonable time.
3. Calculation of reasonable time
Before we can proceed to consider what constitutes a
reasonable time we must first answer a more basic question: a

35

36

Ibld
Johnson, supra, note 33 at 167.
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reasonable time for what? The obvious response one might expect
to that question is "a reasonable time to pay." But surely if that is
all that is meant, then a reasonable time may very well consist only
of the time it takes to write a cheque or other some such illusory
protection. A reasonable time must consist of something more if
the intent of the requirement is to be effectuated. It must mean a
reasonable time within which to make the necessary arrangements to
obtain the required funds; that is, a reasonable time in which to
refinance the debt. This purpose was recognized by Rutherford J.
in the trial decision in Lister37 and has been noted elsewhere 3 8 It
is also inferred from Linden J.'s assertion that "lenders are more
reluctant to lend money to businesses in receivership than they are
to other businesses.'6 9 Even if somewhat understated, it is
nevertheless implicit in this comment that the very purpose of the
reasonable time doctrine is to permit the debtor to make alternative
financing arrangement while it still is able to do so. Only with this
purpose in mind can the reasonable time doctrine accomplish its
underlying policy.
It has been repeatedly emphasized that what constitutes a
reasonable time will depend upon all the facts and circumstances in
each particular case, as they existed at the time of enforcement. 40
The factors to be assessed in each individual situation have been set

37

Lister, supra, note 9 at 154.

38 See, for example, 3.1. McLean, "Reasonable Demand" in EnforcingDebenture Security
(Vancouver:. The Continuing Legal Education Society of British Columbia, 1984) 1.3 at 1.3.02
and 1.3.09. See also F. Bennet, "Rights and Remedies of a Debtor in a Receivership" in F.
Bennet & J. Berman, eds, Handbook on Receivership (Toronto: Insight Educational Services
Limited, 1983) at 63.
39 Supra, note 12 at 251 of C.B.R1
See also, Proud and Parkway Vomkmsagon Ltd v.
NationalBank of Canada(1985), 57 Nfld. & P.E.LR. 14 (P.E.I. CA.). In this case the bank
argued that reasonable notice had been given, if measured from the date of seizure to date
of sale. In rejecting the argument, Macdonald J. asked, at 19, "[w]ho would make a loan to
a business that had just had all its assets seized and removed from the province?"
40 See, for example, Ronald Elhyn Lister Ltd v. Dunlop Canada Ltd (1982), 41 C.B.R.
(N.S.) 272 at 288 (S.C.C.); and (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 4 at 16 (CA); Mister Broadloom
Corp. (1968) Ltd. s. Bank of Montreal,supra, note 12 at 252, note 17 at 3-4; Skyrotors, supra,
note 27 at 242.
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out in the oft-quoted passage from the decision of Linden J. in
Mister Broadloom:
[l]n assessing what length of time is reasonable'in a particular fact situation various
factors must be analyzed: (1) the amount of the loan; (2) the risk to the creditor
of losing his money or the security;, (3) the length of the relationship between the
debtor and the creditor (4) the character and reputation of the debtor;, (5) the
potential ability to raise the money required in a short period; (6) the circumstances
surrounding the demand for payment; and (7) any other relevant factors4 1

Each factor is to be applied in its turn to the facts of the particular
case. In Mister Broadloom, the amount demanded was $600,000.
Added to this was the fact that a demand was also being made from
a related company, bringing the total amount to be raised by the
principals to $1,500,000. Such a large sum was said to "indicate that
a period of time would be needed to arrange for payment."42 As to
the second factor, there appeared to be some real risk to the bank
if it did not act quickly. The business was insolvent and the security
was declining in value. This element of potential risk was said to be
"weighed heavily" in the assessment, and the creditor need not wait
until the security vanishes before it takes action.43 The long
(thirteen years) and satisfactory relationship between the principals
of the debtor and the bank is also to be taken into account,
presumably here extending what would otherwise be a reasonable
time. Also to receive "considerable weight" in this case was the
fourth factor: the fact that the officers at the head office of the
bank had lost confidence in the ability and integrity of the principals
of Mr. Broadloom. As to the fifth factor, there was a good
likelihood that the debtor would be able to raise the necessary funds
to satisfy the demand within a relatively short period of time.
Finally, there was the "inexplicable behaviour of the debtor at the
time of the demand in failing to make a specific proposal."44
After having taken all of the factors into account and after

41 MisterBroadloom, supra, note 12 at 253.
42 Ibid at 254.
43

id at 254.

44 id at 257.
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having given each its appropriate weighting, Linden ".concluded
that the forty to fifty minutes afforded to the debtor to meet the
unexpected demand for payment of $1,500,000 was a reasonable
time, notwithstanding his specific finding that "[t]he chances of the
debtor being able to raise the money owed in a short period of time
were pretty good."45 After all the appeals to reasonableness
contained in Linden .s judgment, the learned judge seemed to have
been primarily motivated by the fact that the debtor neither
requested time nor made adequate proposals for payment; and the
learned judge was motivated by this circumstance, notwithstanding
his express recognition of the fact that the debtor "was
46
inexperienced and was in a state of shock at what was happening.
So much for the atmosphere of reasonableness!
The irony inherent in the decision was recognized by the
Court of Appeal in the following terms:
In essence, Linden J.was faced with the question of whether the period of 40 to
50 minutes was a reasonable time to meet an unexpected demand for immediate
payment of the large sum of $1,500,000. Merely to ask the question is to invite the
obvious response that it could not be a reasonable time unless there plainly were
no resources available to meet the debt or unless it were certain that the debtors
would abscond with their assets.... It was unrealistic, if not illusory, to suggest that
the brief 40 to 50-minute period ...
constituted
a reasonable time for payment of
47
the large debt demanded by the bank.

Of course, at the time Linden J. heard Mister Broadloom, he did not
have the benefit of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Lister which held, as noted above, that the debtor was entitled to
reasonable notice notwithstanding a failure to request time to pay.
While the trial decision in Mister Broadloom has thus been overruled
in this respect, the seven factors outlined by Linden 3. have been
adopted and applied elsewhere 4 8
45

Tid at 255.

46

ibid. at 256.

47

Supra, note 17 at 9.

48 See, for example, Brake's ConstructionCompany Limited v. Bank of Montreal (1982),
46 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81 at 96-98 (Nfld. S.C. [IT.D.]); Cal Glass, supra, note 29 at 18-19; Four-K,
supra, note 18 at 160-61; FederalBusinessDevelopmentBank v.Dunn (1984), [1984] 6 W.W.R.
46 (Sask. Q.B.) at 52-53; Bank of Montreal v. Western Shore Supplies Ltd (1983), 57 N.S.R.
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In Lister, demand for payment of the sum of $127,160.84 was
made on the morning of 20 March 1972. Before Mr. Lister had
even finished reading the demand letter, he was handed a formal
notice, addressed to the company and its directors, that a receiver
had been appointed. Although he originally objected to the
possession of the premises by the receiver, his objection was
withdrawn a few hours later (after he had been assured that his
personal guarantee would not be enforced.)
The few hours
effectively granted to the debtor was held, by the Supreme Court of
Canada, not to constitute a reasonable time to satisfy the demand;
and this was so notwithstanding Mr. Lister's statement, before
seizure, that he did not intend to advance further monies to the
company. This was said to be "something quite different from a
49
waiver of a right to reasonable notice."
Similarly, in SeawaterProducts, the bank demanded payment
under a debenture of $500,000.0 As part of the "comedy of errors
on the part of the bank,"51 the appointment of the receiver
"followed within moments or 1 1/2 days depending on whether one
takes the view that a receiver is appointed when he is nominated or
when he accepts his nomination."52 It was held that no reasonable
time for payment had been given.

(2d) 118 (N.S.S.C., T.D.) at 121-22; Proud and Parway Volkswagon Ltd v. National Bank of
Canada, supra, note 39; Royal Bank of Canada v. Estabrooks PontiacBuick Ltd (1985), 28

B.L.R. 1 (N.B.C.A.) at 13; Wtonnock IndustriesLtd v. NationalBank of Canada,supra, note
24; and CanadianImperialBank of Commerce v. Quesnel Machinery Ltd, supra, note 30.
49 Supra, note 14 at 289 of C.B.R.
50

Supra, note 21.

51 bid, at 30.
52 _]bld at 32.
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While these, as well as a number of other cases,5 3 may be
cited as examples of situations in which the creditor failed to
provide the debtor with a reasonable time, one ought not to be left
with the impression that the debtor will always have at least-several
days within which to arrange alternate financing. In Cal Glass,
demand was made, after banking hours, for repayment of a debt of
$425,000. Approximately thirty minutes was given to the debtor
before the receiver arrived. After an application of the seven
factors set out by Linden 3. in Mister Broadloom, and after
considering all of the circumstances of the case, it was held that "the
plaintiff acted reasonably and that ... under the circumstances, it was
reasonable for the plaintiff to give Cal Glass only a nominal amount
of time to meet the demand."54 Fawcus I. seemed persuaded by the
following factors: (1) the debtor was invoicing its inventory to
another company in order to avoid third party demands; (2) preparations were being made to remove certain assets from the debtor's
premises; and (3) the ability or potential ability of the debtor to
the debtor had no source of
refinance the debt was improbable ...
funds.
A nominal period, this time one of several hours, was also
held to be sufficient in Brake's Construction Company Limited v.
Bank of Montreal 55 In this case, the debt was slightly in excess of
$280,000. A written demand was delivered at 9:30 a.m. for
repayment in full by 12:00 noon. On request of the debtor, the
time for payment was extended to 3:00 p.m. The receiver took
possession of the debtor's property at approximately 4:00 p.m. that
day. Again the seven factors set out in Mister Broadloom were
applied; and again it was held that the time allowed for repayment

53 See, for example, Proud and Parkway Volkewagon Ltd v. National Bank of Canada,
supra, note 39; Re Sooke Forest ProductsLtd (1984), 55 C.B.R. (N.S.) 268 (B.C.S.C.); Moose
ProduceLtd v. Royal Bank of Canada,supra, note 19; Royal Bank of Canada v. Estabrooks
PontiacBuick Ltd,supra, note 48; Northern Meat PackersLtd v. Roynat Ltd (1985), 164 A.P.R.
41 (N.B.Q.B. T.D.); Whonnock IndustriesLtd v. NationalBank of Canada,supra, note 24; and
Bank ofMontrealv. Wilder (1986), 2 S.C.R. 551, aff'g (1983), 149 D.LR. (3d) 193 (B.C.C.A.),
affg, in part, (1980), 19 B.C.L.R. 77 (B.C.S.C.).
54

Supra, note 29 at 19.

55 (1982), 46 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81.
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was reasonable. Among the factors relied upon by the court were
the following: (1) the amount of the loan was large, but, unlike
Mister Broadloom where payment was demanded immediately, here
originally two and one-half hours were given for repayment and
even this was extended for a further three hours; (2) the value of
the security was declining and the ability of the bank to recover its
loan was being reduced by the actions of other creditors; (3) the
debtor was continually in excess of its line of credit; (4) a contract
that was expected to produce large profits for the company actually
resulted in losses; and (5) the company had a large working capital
deficiency. After considering each of the factors in turn, it was held
that "in light of legal authority and the facts and circumstances of
time allowed the plaintiff for repayment was
this case 5the
6
reasonable."
In the Skyrotors case the debenture secured a line of credit
of $150,000. On 6 March 1975, the bank both demanded its loan
and appointed a receiver. Osborne J. considered all of the
circumstances of the case including the security document, the
relations between the debtor and the creditor, and the absence of
any apparent solution to the corporation's financial problems, and
concluded that the bank acted reasonably.
The above authorities, in addition to numerous others, may
be referred to as examples of situations in which the creditor was
held to have fulfilled its obligation to provide the debtor with a
reasonable time within which to meet a demand for payment;
56

]bid at 99.

57 See, for example, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Quesnel Machinery Ltd,
supra, note 30; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Prosser (1981), 41 N.B.R. (2d) 671
(Q.B., T.D.); Bank of Montreal v. Western Shore Supplies Ltd, supra,note 48; FederalBusiness
Development Bank v. Dunn, supra, note 48; Burik EnterprisesIna v. Bank of Montreal (1985),
30 A..W.S. (2d) 98 (Ont. H.CJ.); Re S.P.M. PlasticsLtd (1983), 48 C.B.R. (N.S.) 255 (Ont.
S.C.); Nobes v. Royal Bank of Canada,supra,note 20; 263121 OntarioLtd, carryingon business
as Alpha Engineeringv. Toronto Dominion Bank (1984), 27 A.C.W.S. (2d) 381 (Ont. S.C.); and
ContinentalBank of Canada of Canadav. Maple Leaf Helicopters Ltd, supra, note 19.
See also Wzonnock IndustriesLtd v. NationalBank of Canada,supra, note 24 at 32, where

it was said that "t]o the defendant's knowledge there was no realistic expectation that CanAm
could pay its debt in anything less than 30 days. Not only was 7 days' notice far too short,
anything less than 30 days' notice would also have been too short. The notice given was
artificial, since the defendant knew that payment could not be made any sooner than the 30
days' extension which CanAm requested"
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however, a number of these cases suggest that a reasonable time is
sometimes relatively short. The courts have sometimes narrowly
interpreted the "reasonable time" requirement in this way,
notwithstanding the fact that the underlying purpose of the
requirement is to permit the debtor to refinance its debt, and,
notwithstanding the fact that the "notice given must not be illusory
and must give the debtor a reasonable time to act."5 8 It is
important to keep in mind that the facts and circumstances of the
case are not assessed in order to determine whether the debtor
ought to be afforded a reasonable time to satisfy a demand for
payment, for the debtor is entitled to reasonable notice in every
case. Rather, the factors are applied and the circumstances are
assessed in order to determine, in each case, what constitutes such
reasonable notice. It is not the purpose of this paper to provide the
reader with a set of rules by which the appropriate number of hours
or days may be calculated; they have been attempted elsewhere 9
58 Supra, note 17 at 4.
See also, Canada, Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Report: Proposed
Bankruptcy Act Aendments (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1986).
It is interesting to note that the Report recommended, at 38, that the Banknuptcy Act,
RLS.C. 1970, c. B-3, be amended to include provisions controlling the appointment and
conduct of receivers where the debtor is insolvent, irrespective of whether the debtor is
adjudged bankrupt. Specifically, it recommended, at 43, that the secured creditor should be
required to obtain leave of the bankruptcy court to appoint a receiver. The advantages of
such a requirement were explained, at 43-44, as follows:
The debtor is given an opportunity to have a court hearing before any property is
seized. The creditor obtains an immediate decision confirming its right to appoint
a receiver and avoiding a subsequent lawsuit over the issue. The current problem
of what consitutes reasonable notice of the creditor's intention to enforce this
security is resolved before the receiver enters into possession.
The Report continued, at 44, to recommend an automatic 21-day stay, subject to variation by
the court, on sales out of the ordinary course of business and removal of the debtor's
property.
59 See, for example, W.S. Robertson, "Enforcement: Demands" in Workouts and
Enforcing Creditors' Security (Toronto: Insight Educational Services, 1984) Tab 1 at 42-43
where the author suggests that ordinarily, more than 20 days may be safely ruled out as
unreasonably long, unless there are exceptional circumstances. Between 10 and 20 days is said
to be reasonable only if the debtor is able to make sound proposals indicating some ability
to raise the required funds during the period, along with adequate measures to ensure that
the security does not decline in value during the period. Between 0 and 10 days is said to
be a reasonable time if there is a slight possibility that the funds can be raised. This period,
it is suggested, would be a reasonable time in most cases. See also C.H. Morawetz,
Annotation (1984) 49 C.B.R. (N.S.) 2, where it is suggested that if a creditor could not be
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Nor do we think that a new set of rules will resolve the justice
issues as our discussion in section DI below shows. Rather, we are
concerned here to enquire into the nature and scope of
reasonableness itself. Its application is relevant for present purposes
only to the extent that it demonstrates the relative degree of success
(or lack thereof) of the reasonable time requirement in achieving its
underlying policy. How does one rationalize the statement of the
rule (that after a demand for payment the debtor is entitled to a
reasonable time within which to satisfy the demand, presumably by
refinancing the debt) with its application (particularly those cases in
which no time, or a purely nominal time, was held to be
reasonable)? 60
We suggest that the difference between the way in which the
rule is stated and the way in which it is applied stems from a basic

sure that there were plainly no resources available to meet the debt or that it was certain that
the debtor would abscond with its assets, then it would be necessary to give between 48 hours
and 10 days notice. The precise amount of time within that range is said to depend upon a
number of factors: (1) the size of the debt; (2) the business of the debtor;, (3) the location
of the debtor;, (4) the proximity of the bank; and (5) any other relevant factors.
Another commentator has suggested that the rule of thumb should be 3 full business
days, although the court might accept a shorter period in special circumstances. To decide
if there are any "special circumstances," the court will balance the interests of the debtor and
the creditor and consider the following factors: (1) the size of the loan; (2) the risk of rapid
asset value deterioration; (3) the character and reputation of the debtor;, (4) any fraudulent
preferences or misrepresentations by the debtor;, (5) the pre-demand history of discussions and
negotiations that would indicate to the debtor that the bank had serious concerns; (6) whether
there was a plain deficiency of assets; (7) whether time to pay was offered; (8) whether the
debtor could have raised the funds if time had been extended; (9) whether it was certain the
debtor would have absconded with the assets; and (10) whether the debtor had given a clear
indication that it no longer wished to carry on business. See Varley, "Receivership: The
Contest Between Secured and General Creditors" in MA Springman & E. Gertner, eds,
Debtor-CreditorLaw. Practice and Doctrine (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) at 456.
See also, Johnson, supra, note 33.
60 One answer has been suggested as follows:
[Wihile the condition precedent to the secured party being able to enforce his
security by taking possession is expressed as being that he grant a reasonable time
to pay following demand, the question actually considered by the court always seems
to be whether or not the secured party acted reasonably in the particular
circumstances of the case, regardless of how nominal or even non-existent the time
given may have been ... One is inclined to wonder if the true rationale might be
better expressed as a limitation on the exercise of self-help.
R. Robertson, 'Remedies Under Security Documents" (1981) Law Society of Upper Canada
Special Lectures: New Developments in the Law of Remedies 35 at 56.
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misunderstanding of the underlying purpose of the reasonable time
requirement. As we have argued above, the rule goes to procedural
fairness rather than to the constituent elements of default. It does
not appear to be particularly helpful, in light of its underlying
purpose, to construe the terms of a demand or debenture or, for
that matter, any other loan agreement, as including an implied term
to extend reasonable notice. To do so obscures the true nature of
the requirement. As suggested above, the creditor is not just
prevented from enforcing its security as a result of any contractual
constraint such as the absence of default, the absence of a valid
demand for payment, or indeed the non-compliance with any other
contractual term. Rather, the creditor is prevented from enforcing
its security simply because the creditor ought not to be permitted to
do so until the debtor has had one last reasonable opportunity to
avoid the catastrophic consequences of default. Thus, the creditor's
behaviour is circumscribed simply because the courts presuppose
procedural fairness to be important. Once this is accepted, it will
no longer be necessary for courts to create a "rule" about
"reasonable time." The question will then become, "has the creditor
proceeded in a procedurally just fashion?"
III. JUSTICE ISSUES
The traditional response to an academic's suggestion that
lawyers consider 'justice issues" is that such an enquiry takes the
lawyer and judge beyond his or her proper role into the realm of
policy. Policy concerns politics, preference, unsubstantiated wishful
thinking, it is believed; and one person's preference is as good as
the next person's. Accordingly, the lawyer should leave policy to the
public at large. He or she should retreat to his or her more
familiar, seemingly more certain, world of legal rules.
An attempt has been made elsewhere, however, to argue that
rules of law are metaphysical constructs which intercede between the
lawyer and the world he or she wishes to comprehend. 61 Rules of
law act as abstract prisms which pre-censor the perceptible world
61 Conklin, supra, note 2, and W.E. Conklin, Images of a Constitution (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990) c. I and 13.
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"out there." The more abstract the rules and the more scientific our
analytic tools as lawyers, the more distant is the perceptible world
from the rules with which the lawyer works. Accordingly, judicial
decisions can sometimes offer a primitive resource 6material
with
2
which to attempt to understand the world of practice.
Because of the shallow "subjective" character of policy and
because of the risk that legal rules might misdescribe the practice of
receivership, it is advantageous to transcend the traditional
policy/rules approach to Anglo-American-Canadian legal analysis.
This essay attempts to show how that is possible. In place of a
"policy analysis," this essay appeals to the forms of justice. The legal
rules elaborated in section II above are intended merely to
supplement a more diversified and realistic resource material with
which to apprehend the actual practice of receivership.
No doubt an expensive economic/social survey would provide
one with the most reliable, more precise, and objective resource
material with which to perceive the practice of receivership. The
approach of this essay has been less systematic and admittedly
eclectic. One source of resource material for this enquiry has been
the testimony before various parliamentary committees during the
early 1980s. While a parliamentary committee does not offer a
forum to test the credibility of a witness as one finds in a court of
law, the media attentiveness and social stress surrounding the
particular sittings under discussion do warrant that one give some
weight to the credibility of the witnesses. The large number of
similar cases discussed in the hearings lends additional support to
the credibility of the witnesses. This resource material has been
supplemented by the use of a series of empirically oriented studies
of the commercial finance industry by respected scholars,63 one
62

This misdescription and misdirection may prevent the lawyer from identifying, let alone
appreciating, the victims of laws.
63 J.L. McMullan, "Social Resistance and the Exploited Poor in the Low-Income
Marketplace: The Case of Debt Collection in Two Montreal Communities" (1982) 19 Can.
Rev. Soc. & Anth. 326; W. Carroll, J.Fox, & M.D. Ornstein, "he Network of Directorate
Links among the Largest Canadian Firms' (1982) 19 Can. Rev. Sociol. & Anthr. 44; NV.
Carroll, 'The Individual, Class & Corporate Power in Canada" (1984) 9 Can. J.Sociol. 245;
NV. Carroll, 'The Canadian Corporate Elite: Financiers or Finance Capitalists?" 8 Stud. Pol.
Econ. 89; P.F. Haas, "Social Responsibility. An Indicator of Market Power" (1977) 35 Rev.
Soc. Econ. 185; and G. Lermer, 'The Performance of Canadian Banking" (1980) 13 Can. J.
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empirical study of debt collection in two Montreal communities in
1982,64 interviews and statistical studies collected by two of Canada's
most respected journalists,65 various studies published in banking and
business journals, 66 and by discussions held in the early 1980s with
lawyers, merchants, real estate agents, farmers, and others from

Southern Essex County.
This resource material is of little use unless one knows what
one is looking for. Obviously, one could rest content with judicial
decisions if one were only searching for rules of law. And, if one
were limited by the rules/policy dichotomy, one would focus upon
that resource material which would support one's own preferences,
prejudices, et cetera. In an effort to escape from such a stricture as
the rulelpolicy dichotomy offers, this study has gone to the forms of
justice.
The forms of justice, not legal rules nor political
preferences, provide the focal point of this inquiry. The following
sections will demonstrate how the forms of justice can provide a
constructive frame of reference with which to identify the relevant
issues surrounding the rules and practice of receivership.

Econ. 578.
64 McMullan, supra, note 63.
65 See Newman, supra, note 1 and V. Stewart, Towers of Gold Feet of Clay (Toronto:
Collins, 1982).
66 See G.F. Boreham, "Academic Looks at Banking" (1976) 83 Can. Banker & I.C.B.
Rev. 4; G.F. Boreham, 'Te Changing Nature of Canadian Banking" (1983) 90 Can. Banker
& LC.B. Rev. 6; Papadopoulos, supra, note 1; and J.H. Perry, "Government and the Banks:
Laws, Laws, and More Laws" (1981) 88 Can. Banker & I.C.B. Rev. 4.
See also, J. Bumister, "'he Challenge of Change in Banking" (1983) 48 Bus. Q. 82; D.
Coxe, "Above the Law: banks have been allowed to play by their own rules and this has
nearly had disastrous consequences" (1984) 57 Can. Bus. 170; D. Jenish, "Rebellion Against
the Banks- Seven Alberta Firms Sue Over Receiverships and Tough Tactics" (1984) 11 Alta.
Rep. 26; J.M. Messiner, '"What Do Bankers Expect of Receivers?" (1982) 115 Ca. Mag. 102;
B. McDougall, "On the Ropes: Its a Struggle to Pull Yourself out of Receivership when your
Bank's not in your Corner" (1984) 3 Small Bus. 30; M. Tefft, "Handling of Receiverships
Scrutinized as Business Failures Continue to Grow" (1983) 77 Fin. Post 23 (26 November);
C. Berstein, 'Banks have Limits on their right to self-Protection" The [Toronto] Globe and
Mail (11 February 1985) B8.
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It has been argued elsewhere that justice has two general
forms: procedural justice and substantive justice.67 The more
familiar form of justice in the Canadian legal system is the former.
Procedural justice assumes or claims that if an institution, decisionmaker, or electorate can reach a decision according to a fair
procedure, the procedure itself will ensure that the outcome will be
just. This presupposition underlies much of administrative law,
evidence, criminal, securities, and Charter law. Lawyers, judges,
reformers, and politicians have concentrated their efforts so as to
identify the conditions essential to a fair process in varying contexts.
Once society has reached a consensus as to the constitutive elements
of a fair procedure, lawyers and judges have scrupulously insisted
that the procedure be properly followed. The appointment of a
receiver has been no exception to this traditional concern for
procedural fairness. As explained and documented in section II B
above, the common law courts have superimposed a "reasonable
time" requirement upon "demand" debentures out of deference to
procedural justice. By creating the "reasonable time" requirement,
the Canadian courts presupposed that any eventual distribution of
property pursuant to a receivership would be just. That is, the
justice embedded in the procedure by which a creditor enforced his
security would translate itself into a just outcome.
Substantive justice recognizes that a fair procedure will not
guarantee a just outcome. Rather, one must examine the content
of the outcome itself in order to ascertain the justice (or injustice)
of a decision. Further, one must question whether the content of
the outcome is consistent with a criterion (or criteria) of justice
independent of and prior to both the procedure and the outcome.
That is why this second form of justice has been called substantive,
rather than procedural justice. We intend to show that although
Canadian courts appealed to procedural justice in their creation of
the "reasonable tim&' requirement, the rule did not accomplish
procedural justice during the early 1980s, and the requirement
cannot possibly provide procedural justice more generally. As a
67

The distinction between the two forms is identified and developed in W.E. Conklin,
"Clear Cases" (1981) 31 U. Toronto LJ. 231. The implications of the distinction for the
study of law are discussed in W.E. Conklin, "A Practical Legal Education" (1982) 7 Dal. Li.
122.
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consequence of these two conclusions, the court's focus upon
procedural justice is misdirected. One can fully comprehend the
doctrine and practice of appointing a receiver only if one looks to
the forms of substantive justice, and only one form of substantive
justice at that.
A- ProceduralJustice Issues
Procedural justice assumes, again, that the fairness of a
procedure will translate itself into a just outcome. The task of a
lawyer, judge, or reformer is to identify those conditions necessary
to ensure a procedurally fair call of a loan. Section II B above
showed that ,that was the very purpose for which Canadian Courts
re-emphasized, if not created, the "reasonable time' requirement.
Judges in such cases as Mister Broadloom and Lister sought to
scrutinize whether reasonable time had been allowed in particular
circumstances. Two questions come to the forefront. Has the
requirement assured procedural justice?
Secondly, can the
requirement ever guarantee procedural justice?
1. Has the requirement assured procedural justice?
Procedural justice goes to the procedural conditions
preceding a decision. One such condition is that "ought implies
can!': that is, that the debtor can be reasonably expected to perform
his or her contractual duties upon signing a demand debenture. A
second condition is that the decision-maker reach his or her decision
equitably: that is, that he or she treat similar cases similarly. Third,
parties affected by the decision were fully informed of the
alternatives prior to embarking upon one alternative over another.
The resource material in this study suggests that the three conditions
have not been met, particularly during the early 1980s.
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2. Procedural conditions precedent to reaching a decision
a) That ought implies can68
First, as the economic circumstances during the early 1980s
dramatically illustrate, procedural justice cannot always be fulfilled.
This is important because procedural justice assumes that if the
individual is given a fair opportunity to fulfill his or her duties, he
or she will be able to do so. It presupposes that if he or she
cannot, his or her failure to do so stems from matters within his or
her own competence. Enforcement of security in the circumstances
is deemed just. However, this necessarily assumes that a debtor can
be reasonably expected to perform his or her contractual duties.
The corollary of this assumption is that inability to perform a legal
duty due to circumstances beyond one's control marks the failure of
a constituent element of procedural justice.
The public record suggests that the factors triggering most
loan calls during the early 1980s were entirely external to the
debtor's management competence, foreseeability, blameworthiness,
and control. The most important factor during that period was the
extraordinarily rapid rise in interest rates beginning in late 1979.
The prime interest rate charged by the Bank of Canada to chartered
banks gradually climbed from 12% on 28 February 1979, to 22.75%
in August 1981, where it remained until 11 September 1981. By
1984, however, the Bank of Canada had gradually lowered this rate
to its former level. It is not within the scope of this essay to
allocate economic blame for this extraordinary phenomenon.
Whether the cause be the pressure for interest payments on
government deficits, the outstanding interest payments due from
Poland, Mexico, Brazil, and other countries, the outstanding interest
payments due to Government and banks from companies which the
government and banks had bailed out (such as Massey-Ferguson,
Dome Petroleum, and the like), or the invisible hand of the market:
in no way can the source of the interest rate climb be attributed to
the general incompetence of the small businessperson. Nor can it
68 This condition is best described in I. RawlsA Theory ofJustice (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971) at 236-237; and L Fuller, The Morality ofLaw, rev'd ed. (New Haven
& London: Yale University Press, 1964) at 70-78.
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be attributed to his or her control, notwithstanding the fact that
default of most debentures hung upon a floating interest rate.
Further, against this international and domestic background, there
were regional economic factors external to the small businessperson's
control. So, for example, the declining markets for American-made
cars had a serious impact upon the Southern Ontario region. Again,
whatever the economic causes of the declining markets, the small
businessperson's debenture was subject to them.
Not infrequently, businesspersons found themselves
entrapped in the reverberating circumstances brought on by the call
of a loan in the same region, industry, or trade. Much of the
business community hangs upon a psychological confidence in the
present and future. This is reflected in some debentures which
directly or indirectly incorporate market value land and property
prices as a built-in factor in ascertaining a condition of default. But
the call of one or two loans in important businesses in a community
can rapidly undermine the community's confidence in the future.
Since a privately appointed receiver wishes to obtain the best price
as soon as possible and to meet the secured creditors' debt - but
not necessarily that of other secured creditors, unsecured creditors,
or shareholders - the receiver invariably sells his or her property at
less than fair market value. Once the public realizes that a business
is in receivership, interested prospective purchasers of the assets
expect a lower or "firesale" price. But that event of receivership
triggers lower market values throughout the community. This is
especially so when the first call of a loan is to a chain of businesses
located throughout a region. The lower land prices, in turn,
collapse the equity of other businesspersons and increase the risk of
a default in their own loan agreements.
Again, the bank's initial decision to call the loan of a small
business may trigger a multiplying effect resulting in a decline in the
overall market value of the assets of many other businesses. But
the latter's default is entirely outside its control in that the decisions
underlying the default are made by the lender, even though the
business may have been warranted in acting as it did in any
particular case. The receivership phenomenon, therefore, takes on
an air of irrationality from the viewpoint of the debtor, the
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community at large, and, indeed, the lender.
The lender digs his or
69
her own grave by initiating this process.

b) Equal treatment
Procedural justice also requires that the process leading to
the enforcement of security be equitably administered.70 The public
record does not inform one as to the equitable enforcement of
security amongst farmers and small businesspersons according to
region and industry. The record does demonstrate, however, how
the enforcement procedures applied to small businesspersons and
farmers were noticeably absent for those national and multi-national
corporations which defaulted in their loan agreements during the
same time period. During a 1981 board meeting of one chartered
bank, for example, the Board decided to buy $150,000,000 in
convertible preferred shares from a large debtor company, the bank
helped to put together a $715,000,000 distribution of new capital,
and the bank forgave its loan interest due from the debtor company,
according to Walter Stewart.71 The debtor company had been losing
extraordinarily large sums of money over the preceding months.
Two of the debtor's officers served on the boards of each of the
three banks to whom the debtor company was indebted, and the
vice-president of one of the creditor banks later joined the debtor's
Board. With the help of various provincial and federal governments,
the commercial banks allowed major Canadian corporations (such as
Dome Petroleum, Chrysler Canada, and others) to renegotiate their
69 See generally cases described by Mr. Ralph Barrie (President, Ontario Federation of
Agriculture) in Minutes of Proceedings& Evidence of Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
& Economic Affairs, 1st sess. 32nd. Par. 1080-83, 89:6-8 (2015-2020); Barrie at 89:20-23
(2055-2110); and Mrs. Alix Granger (Confederation of National Trade Unions) at 102:37-39
(1815-1825). See also, A. Fisher, '"Farming's Mortgaged Future' (1986) Vol. 2 No. 10 Report
on Business Magazine (The Globe & Mail) 24.
70 This requirement is a critical element of the Canadian legal culture. See generally,
W.E. Conklin, 'The Utilitarian Theory of Equality Before the Law" (1976) 8 Ottawa L. Rev.
485.
71 See Stewart, supra, note 65 at 114.
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loan agreements in circumstances that were quite similar to the
circumstances justifying the call of loans to small businesspersons,
farmers, and consumers throughout Canada. The point of noting
this apparent inequity is not to suggest that governments and banks
should have placed such companies into receivership as they had the
25,000 "small" and "medium-sized" Quebec businesses alone during
1981 and 1982 (that is, approximately 17 percent of the total
number of small and medium-sized businesses in Quebec at the
time). 72 Rather, the special treatment granted to Canada's major
corporations violated an important constituent element of fairness:
namely, that all parties be treated equally before the law. The
distinct unequal treatment of small businesspersons/farmers vis-il-vis
Canada's powerful and interconnected businesses assured that a
rigorous adherence to the "reasonable time" requirement in the case
of the small businesspersons could not guarantee procedural justice
during the circumstances of the early 1980s.
c) Appraisal of the alternatives
A third constituent element of procedural justice is that, in
order for a process to be fair, the parties must be informed of the
alternatives. Without being informed, choice is illusory.73 This third
element is very important when one examines the fairness of a
procedure not at an isolated point in'a process (such as during or
immediately after the call of a loan) but over an extended period of
time. The latter context ushers forth the issue whether small
businesspersons and farmers were fully informed of the negative
consequences when they signed their demand loan agreements
during the 1970s. Prior to the 1980s, Canada's financial institutions
72

However, the small Business Secretariat of the Federal Department of Consumer and

Corporate Affairs estimated that from 2 to 5 times that number of businesses simply closed
their doors, sold their inventory and assets, or had their assets seized by banks without
publicly declaring "bankruptcy." This meant that an additional 15,000 to 38,000 businesses
quietly collapsed in Quebec during those two years, according to the Canadian Press on 16
May 1983.
73

This requirement of informed choice is best explained in H.L.A. Hart, "AreThere any
Natural Rights?" in A.L. Melden & 3. Waldron, eds, Theodes ofRights (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1985).
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77

had expanded loans to small businesspersons and farmers.74 This, in
turn, raised the latter's expectation of profits; an expectation which
only a lender's confidence in a businessperson can bring.7s Financial
institutions were not alone in expanding credit and thereby
projecting an optimistic future. Government and government
agencies encouraged small businesspersons and farmers to think that
this was the only realistic alternative. The Central Mortgage and
Housing Corporation, for example, influenced expectations through
loans at below-market interest rates; capital contributions for low
and moderate-income housing, rural and native housing, and rental
accommodation; loans and grants to assist municipal land assembly,
sewage, water projects, and low-income housing and low-rental
housing; and subsidies for home insulation. Similarly, the Federal
Business Development Bank financed businesses that had been
unable to obtain credit under reasonable terms from traditional
financial institutions.7 6 The Farm Credit Corporation had, by 31
March 1979, made 71,722 outstanding loans totalling 2.7 billion
dollars for farm purchases, the purchase of livestock, machinery,
equipment or buildings, and the sale of farms. And the Export
Development Corporation insured commercial credit for the
financing of exports and granted loans to foreign buyers of large
capital projects in Canada. By the end of the 1970s, these four
government agencies had extended 8.7 billion dollars to businesses
in Canada - mostly small businesspersons and farmers. In addition,
numerous provincial banks and development corporations held out
an optimistic forecast of the future. One witness before one
parliamentary committee insisted, for example, that the Ontario
Industrial Milk Incentive Programme had placed no limit to the
74

As reported by Canadian Press (Montreal). Evidence before Farm CreditArrangements
Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on Agriculture, 1st sess. 32nd Pan., 1980-83 (issue
4) at 0950. For other examples, see M. Tefft, HandingofReceiverships ScruinizedasBusiness
FailuresContinue to Grow (1983) 77 Fin. Post 23 (26 November 1983).
75 See, for example, the testimony of Mr. Ralph Barrie, President, Ontario Federation
of Labour in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Standing Committee on Finance,Trade

and Economic Affais, 1st sess. 32nd Parl. 1980.83, issue 86. See also, C. Bernstein, 'Banks
Must Toe the Line In Giving Financial Advice!' The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (25 February
1985) B13.
76 See testimony, supra, notes 74 and 75.
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amount of milk expansion assisted by the Programme during the
early 70s until the Ontario Milk Marketing Board cut back quotas
and thereby undermined a farmer's ability to service the debt which
77
he or she had incurred to expand his or her milk production.
The point of identifying the role of financial institutions and
government agencies during the 1970s is not to suggest that they
should not have expanded credit, that they were imprudent, or
intentionally deceptive. Rather, their role provided an important
background to the farmer and small businessperson's financial
arrangements during the 1970s. Procedural justice requires that a
party be fully informed of the options before him or her. If not
informed, the procedure is unfair and the "choice' of restricting
one's general right to be free by signing the contract is illusory.
The expansive role of financial institutions and government raised
the expectation of only one alternative: unlimited optimism. This
optimism extended to the day-to-day financial arrangements of
farmers and small businesspersons. Testimony before parliamentary
committees again and again complained that during 1978 and 1979,
banks advised agricultural producers to agree to floating interest
rates on loans in the expectation that interest rates would fall. 73
The usual trait of a farmer - caution - was swept to the side when
he or she agreed to commit collateral security far in excess of the
amount of funds borrowed; to authorize the lenders, without notice,
to forcibly enter, lease, or sell his or her assets upon demand; and
to call loans at any time during the year (including the period prior
to harvest or prior to readying animals for the market when the
farmer would be unable to repay his or her loans). Again, loans
officers of Canada's financial institutions did not consciously mislead
farmers and small businesspersons prior to the signing of demand
debentures. Indeed, it is inconceivable that each of the 7,500 bank
branches in Canada should have been staffed by competent,
thoughtful, intelligent, well-trained loans officers, who were fully
apprised of the long-term and short-term negative alternatives for a
77 Evidence before Farm Credit Arrangements Sub-Committee of the Standing
Committee on Agriculture, 1st sess. 32nd Pa:. 1980-83 (issue 4) at 0950.
78 See, for example, ibid and Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of Standing
Committee on Finance, Trade & Economic Affairs, 1st sess. 32nd Panl. 1980-83, 89: 6.8.
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small businessperson. It is inconceivable that any loans officer, let
alone farmer/small businessperson, could predict that interest rates
would more than double within months in dire contrast to relative
stability and extraordinary optimism of the prior decade.
Accordingly, an important condition of procedural justice was absent:
the parties were not fully apprised of the negative alternatives
before them. A rigorous adherence to the "reasonable time"
requirement, had it occurred, would not have assured procedural
justice.
3. Can the "reasonable time" requirement ever guarantee procedural
justice?
It was explained in section H- above, that, notwithstanding
the specific wording of demand debentures, Canadian courts have
superimposed a requirement that the creditor must give a debtor
reasonable time to repay a loan before the creditor can legally
enforce its security. But that is a legal rule and a legal rule is an
abstraction. It is a creation of the judge's/lawyer's mind. For that
reason alone, a legal rule does not, by itself, guarantee procedural
justice. The rule may well be divorced from the day-to-day decisions
and social/economic context within which the rule is administered.
We submit that although our Courts created the rule in order to
ensure procedural justice, the social/economic context within which
it is applied renders procedural justice illusory.
First, what is a reasonable time? Section II above showed
that our Courts have held that reasonableness depends upon the
circumstances of each case. But the inevitably open-ended vague
character of reasonableness requires that, to protect his or her
common law right to reasonable time, the borrower must be
prepared to litigate the (un)reasonable time allowed for re-payment.
As a judicial decision in favour of a borrower can have serious
financial repercussions for commercial lenders vis-a-vis other
borrowers, the borrower must be prepared to pay for legal costs to
the appellate level of the court system - indeed, to the Supreme
Court of Canada, if leave to appeal should be granted. Of course,
should the borrower eventually succeed in his or her claim, the
Court will assess costs against the secured creditor on a party/party

.80
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basis (that is, a main part of the borrower's legal and reasonable
expert witness fees). But that eventual reimbursement may be
several years away and, in the meantime, the litigant must advance
funds to his or her lawyers to pay for their fees and disbursements.
Because secured lenders usually require a small businessperson to
sign a personal guarantee as a condition for his or her business loan,
a lawsuit against the lender takes on an exceedingly academic air
once the creditor has retained a private receiver to seize the private
assets, as well as the business assets, of the borrower. Even if his
or her personal assets have not been seized, the borrower does not
find himself or herself to be in the most creditworthy situation to
borrow funds, let alone to borrow funds to sue a confrre of the
prospective lender. Furthermore, our discussion of the judicial
decisions in section II showed that some courts have held that a
short time may be sufficient to meet the common law requirement
of "reasonable time in some circumstances." This fact requires, in
turn, that the borrower have time to gain access to expert legal and
accounting advice in the circumstances of a call.
Our submission is that this factor and the factors discussed
below make the common law requirement of "reasonable time"
extraordinarily academic. The practice belies the abstract theory.
Indeed, the common law requirement itself offends procedural
justice more than it helps in that it makes the public and the
financial institutions believe that procedural justice is being followed
when, in fact, the economic and legal circumstances make the
effective operation of the common law rule negligible.
Second, whether fifty minutes or six months is a "reasonable
time" for repayment of a demand loan, the "reasonable time"
requirement itself does not take into account the fact that since the
early nineteenth century, the function of the commercial lender has
evolved to the point where he is no longer simply a supplier of
funds. Rather, it serves as a "de facto" partner in any business
enterprise. The rule assumes that the lender remains primarily a
lender alone. But the practice of banking suggests that the lender
is a financial adviser who, in some cases, oversees the monthly or
even weekly operation of businesses or to whom businesspersons
must periodically report and justify their management decisions.
Third, the "reasonable time" requirement presupposes that
the small businessperson does have an effective option of obtaining
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alternative financing from his existing lender. We suggest that the
close cohesiveness of the community, described elsewhere, pervades
the local financial community as much as it does at the head office
level. This cohesiveness renders "the opportunity to seek alternative
financing" somewhat redundant. The redundance magnifies itself in
that a borrower is unlikely to possess instant expert information
concerning alternate sources of financing even within his or her own
geographic community. Even if the latter were known, the credit
reputation of the small businessperson is invariably harmed once the
community learns (and a small community invariably learns within
hours) that the local bank has called one's loan. The call is
sometimes accompanied by the freezing of the borrower's accounts
and the dishonouring of outstanding cheques; a practice which can
destroy the credit reputation of the business vis-a-vis the outside
trading world within minutes or hours.
Fourth, the above assumes, of course, that commercial
lenders do attempt to give debtors "reasonable time' to repay their
loans. That is, our above criticisms go to the content of the
common law rule itself and its ineffective role in the practice of
receivership. But the public record indicates otherwise as the bank's
officer explained in Mister Broadloom: "it was not customary to give
notice in such circumstances, because it is felt vital to protect the
prime security, which might possibly be removed if the debtors were
aware of the proposed plans [to enforce the debenture]."79 We
have found little evidence in the public record to show that loans
officers who did call loans were aware of the legal requirement of
"reasonable time" during the early 1980s or, if they were aware, that
they endeavoured to offer adequate notice prior to the enforcement
of security. An abstract rule is one thing. It is quite another for
the principal parties to be informed of that rule. And the latter is
just as important as the rule itself for procedural justice to be more
than illusory.
Fifth, the purpose of the rule is to ensure that the debtor
has an effective opportunity to repay his or her loan. His or her
most realistic alternative is to seek out alternative financing from

79

Supra, note 12 at 246 of O.R. See also, Jenish, supra, note 66 and Bernstein, supra,
note 66.
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another financial institution.
But this prospect is somewhat
academic in that if one commercial lender calls a loan, the odds are
that another dominant competitor will be uninterested. Accordingly,
the borrower must be informed or have quick access to information
about non-traditional lenders. If the borrower should decide to
remain with the present lender, he or she must propose an
alternative financial package. He or she must do this within hours,
depending upon the creditor's interpretation of what constitutes a
"reasonable time." But this, in turn, requires that the small
businessperson have immediate access to accountants, lawyers, or
other advisers who are already sufficiently familiar with the
business's finances, markets, and supplies to be able to ready such
an alternative financial package within hours (or even minutes).
Ironically, whereas loans officers may need days or weeks to study
a loan application before sending it through the institution's
hierarchy for approval, the actual circumstances surrounding the call
of a loan require that, if he or she does have access to expert legal
and financial advice, the businessperson can produce an alternative
financial package within hours. But the call of a loan undermines
the economic and social context presupposed by that package. The
demand loan prevents the debtor from being afforded the time to
make his or her one phone call. Indeed, even if the debtor has the
good fortune of having immediate access to a lawyer, the
accompaniment of a lawyer raises the stakes for the lender. The
lender will naturally see the debtor as an adversary once the debtor
brings in his or her lawyer. And that perception of an adversarial
relationship may well persist with the receiver and the bank months
later.
Sixth, procedural justice requires more than the elements of
reasonable notice, access to a lawyer, access to financial advisors,
and access to effective alternate sources of funding. Procedural
justice requires that decisions that affect the liberty, life, and security
of the person, and the conditions necessary to make the latter
effective, must be justifiable. Our courts have consistently held that
legality involves an appeal to reason and that where rules are
administered without an opportunity for a justificatory process, we
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have fiat -

not law.8 °

The major lobbyist for the Bankers'

Association, Robert McIntosh, appealed to reason rather than fiat
when he once suggested the following:
The criticism you read in the media about calling the loans on some of these guys - that's not the problem. The problem is that most of these guys shouldn't have
been lent that money in the first place and that criticism I accept. Having gotten
into that position, the banks are trying to work their way out of it. Most of the
stories that hit the media, and are causing such a furor politically are about people
who would not measure up to the judgment of the farmers, of their own peers. If
you put them in front of a jury of their own equals in the business, they wouldn't
look so good. 81

The point is, though, that the borrower does not have an
opportunity to test whether his or her competence, management
skills, and financial position "measure up to the judgment of the
farmers, of their own peers." McIntosh's opinion is simply that, an
opinion. The holder of a demand debenture needs no justification,
nor argument, nor evidence for his or her decision to enforce his or
her security unless the decision is litigated. In contradistinction with
legality as reason, the onus to justify oneself seems absent in the
"law" of receivership. Sometimes, the secured creditor fails to
provide the evidence, or the reasons why it considers a debtor in
default of a debenture agreement.8 2 Indeed, as the terms of the
debenture in the Lister case indicated, a debenture may theoretically
allow a demand call for any reason unless, of course, the borrower
80

This has been a concern of recent Chartercases which have focused upon the meaning

of "by law" in section 1 of the Charter. See, for example, Qua Asr. of ProtestantSchool Bds.
v.A..G. Qu. (No. 2) (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 33 (Que. S.C.), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 573 (Que. CA.);
aff'd (sub nor. A.-G. Qua v. Qua. Assn. of ProtestantSc. Eds.) (1984), 10 D.LR. (4th) 321,
54 N.R. 196 (5.C.C.); Ont. Film and Video Appreciation Society v. Ont Bt of Censors (1983),
41 O.R. (2d) 583, 147 D.L.R. (3d) 58 (Div. Ct.); aff'd (1984) 45 O.R. (2d) 80,5 D.L.R. (4th)
766 (Ont. CA.); and Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No. 1) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113, 3
C.C.C. (3d) 515, (sub nom R v. Southam Ina) 34 C.R. (3d) 27, 146 D.L.R. (3d) 408 (Ont.
CA). See also Fuller, supra, note 68 at 91-94; and Rawls, supra, note 68 at 239-40.
81 J. Lindhorst, "The Banks and their Critics - A Panel Discussion" (1983) 11 Bus. Life
18 at 21.
82 See Canadian Press items dated 9 June 1982, and the testimony of Mrs. Alix Granger
(Confederation of National Trade Unions before the Standing Committee on Finance, Trade
and Economic Affairs, 1st sess. 32nd ParI. 1980-83, 102:22-26).
See also: M. Tefft, "Handling of Receiverships Scrutinized as Business Failures Continue
to Grow" Fin. Post (26 November 1983) 23; and Jenish, supra, note 66.
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litigates. Only if the debtor has not signed a personal guarantee
and only if he or she retains sufficient liquid personal funds to
litigate in the courts: only then can the lender be brought to an
accounting. The borrower's lack of funds to pay for a trial and
appeal, his or her lack of effective access to expert counsel and
financial advisor at the time of the call, his or her lack of adequate
notice to seek out alternate sources of financing, the lack of such
alternate financing: these and other factors militate against the very
possibility that the lender will ever be required to provide the
evidence or the reasons for his or her acquisition of the assets of a
borrower. And yet, the "law" of receivership violates the very
principle of legality in practice unless there is such an accounting.
B. Substantive Justice Issues
Procedural justice is only one form of justice. We have
demonstrated above that procedural justice does not accurately
describe the procedures underlying the relationship between a lender
and the borrower when a loan is called, notwithstanding the intent
of the "reasonable time" requirement. Once again, the lawyer is
tempted to appeal to his or her emotive preferences as an exit. But
we wish to suggest that the second important form of justice,
substantive justice, is a more accurate descriptive category with
which to understand the doctrine and practice of the appointment
of a receiver.
Substantive justice suggests that one must go beyond the
procedure itself to a criterion (or criteria) of justice, independent of
and prior to the procedure by which a lender calls a loan. The first
task of the legislator/lawyer is to identify the criterion of justice
presupposed in the content of the existing rules (and practice). If
the criterion is based upon fallacious social or cultural premises, or
if it remains a holdover from the past era, his or her duty is to offer
an alternative criterion and to translate it into reformed rules that
will modify the practice of receivership in fact as well as in form.
In the remainder of this section, we intend to clarify the issues that
the reformer must identify before he or she can resolve the difficult
complexities, competing rights, and the social good involved.
Aristotle tells us that substantive justice can take several forms:
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corrective (rectificatory), distributive, justice in exchange, and
political! 3 Receivership law concerns only the first two forms.
1. Forms of substantive justice and receivership law

Correctivejustice

a)

Corrective justice applies to a private transaction. It must
involve three elements: two parties, a transaction, and a remedy
that places the party harmed back into his or her position prior to
the harm (that is, the "status quo ante").84 Corrective justice
assumes that, prior to the harm, the two parties hold an equal
position. Corrective justice intends to correct the inequality caused
by the harm by transferring resources from the injurer to the injured
party such that the former's gain compensates the latter's loss.
In the event of a demand pursuant to the terms of a demand
debenture, the injured party is assumed to be the lender and the
injurer is assumed to be the debtor. The transaction, of course, is
the loan agreement secured by the demand debenture. Having
borrowed funds from the lender and having failed to pay principal
and interest, the form of corrective justice allows the lender to call
back the loan and to appoint a receiver who will, in turn, sell the
assets so that the parties can be returned to the status quo ante.
That is, the receiver will compensate the lender by transferring
resources from the borrower to the lender such that the debtor's
gain will compensate the lender's loss. That is the theory.
There are several factors in the receivership procedure,
however, that undermine the applicability of the form of corrective

83 Aristotle, Ethics, supra, note 3.
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The form of corrective justice is discussed and applied to tort law in Weinrib, supra,
note 4; to remedies law in Arnold, supra, note 5; and to human rights law in Greenawalt,
supra,note 6 at 47-62. See also, Weinrib, The Intelligibility of dte Rule of Law, supra,note 4
at 59.
After writing this essay, we found a discussion of the application of the forms of justice
to British bankruptcy rules in 3. Finnis, supra,note 7 at 7.
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justice to the law of receivership. We can best appreciate these
factors by returning to the three elements of corrective justice.
First, are there two parties? Yes, on paper, there are two parties
to the agreement. Second, is there a transaction? Yes, the
agreement constitutes the transaction. But at this point the form of
corrective justice loses its descriptive force.
First, the form of corrective justice claims that the wrongdoer
should pay for the compensation. But it would seem that the
burden of compensating the secured creditor falls upon innocent
creditors who were ignorant of the terms of the debenture
agreement and ignorant of the intent of the lender to call the loan
(recall that the usual agreement allows for the lender to call the
loan on demand). These creditors include employees who may well
have put a quarter of a century of labour into the business.
Furthermore, we have seen that during the early 80, the wrongdoer
was not the debtor in many cases. It was not through his or her
incompetent management that the debtor defaulted. Rather,
circumstances external to his or her control and foreseeability
triggered his or her default. We have already identified those
external factors: the doubling of the interest rates, the rapid decline
in the market value of buildings and real estate, the decline in
consumer demand for regional industries, extraordinarily large
defaults of national and multi-national corporations, the large
defaults in foreign governments, and the like. If there was one
wrongdoer, it certainly was not the debtor. Further, if there was a
wrongdoer during the early 80s, the wrongdoer was the Federal
Government which over a period of years allowed the deficit to
climb, guaranteed expensive mega-loans to defaulting corporations,
authorized the chartered banks to grant large scale loans to megacompanies and foreign governments, and meekly allowed the central
bank to double the interest rates. The receivership rules identify
the wrong "wrongdoer" for the harm while the real wrongdoers
escaped from paying the compensation. For these reasons alone,
the form of corrective justice collapses as the appropriate
justificatory and descriptive grounding for existing receivership laws.
Second, aside from the issue as to who should pay for the
harm, corrective justice insists that the compensation should reach
the injured person. But we have shown that under receivership
practice, the receiver's first duty is to the secured lender. This
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practice of reducing the market value of assets to compensate the
secured creditor of them often leaves little balance, if any, for other
creditors or shareholders. Thus, the compensation reaches only a
portion of those persons who actually suffered injury. Further, the
present rules compensate those least harmed in that, relative to their
total assets, the impact of default upon the financial lender's losses
are minuscule relative to the impact upon the employees, unsecured
creditors, suppliers, and shareholders.
Third, what is the source of the harm? Corrective justice
states that the harm caused to the lender must result from the
transaction. That is, the transaction must be the source of the harm
in that, contrary to its terms, the borrower has been unable to repay
the lender upon demand. But we suggested above that the source
of the harm to the lender during the 80s was not the transaction but
the economic factors external to that transaction. The existence of
those externalities undermines a key element in the corrective justice
form.
Fourth, does the status quo ante place the lender and
borrower on an equal plane? We have suggested that a demand
loan is the main source of funds for a small business in Canada.
We have also suggested that due to the social cohesiveness of the
small financial community, the call of a loan from one financial
institution makes it difficult, if not impossible, to gain alternate
funds from one of the remaining traditional lenders. Given the
unrealistic options in the background, the extraordinary asset base
and investment power at a commercial lender's disposal render any
suggestion of equality between the lender and the small
businessperson a fiction. It might render the application of the
corrective justice form coherent, but it does so at the cost of
connecting the form to a semblance of the perceived world. The
remedy of status quo ante begs deeper questions as to why the
community's rules ought to preserve a position of gross inequality of
bargaining power prior to the signing of any debenture agreement.
Fifth, what is the harm? The corrective justice form orients
our focus upon the particular economic loss caused to the lender by
the failure of the businessperson to repay his or her loan upon
demand. But if our claim above has any merit that receivership
practice counters any semblance of procedural justice, then such a
constricted focus is misdirected. The failure of the borrower to
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repay his or her loan upon demand causes economic harm to his or
her employees, suppliers, other creditors, and familyP5 More
importantly, the stress incurred in the perceived arbitrariness of the
lender's decision to call the loan causes unverifiable economic costs
in terms of hospitalization, medical attention, drugs, unemployment
insurance, and the loss of productivity resulting in the destroyed selfesteem of borrowers, employees, and families.
Finally, the
receivership rules and process cause harm to our community's values
of fair play (procedural justice) and corrective justice itself. 86 The
arbitrariness of the call and the lack of a justificatory process prior
to the call offend the former. The receivership rules violate
corrective justice in that the borrower often is not the wrongdoer;
the real wrongdoers do not pay for the compensation; innocent
persons bear the burden of compensation; the compensation does
not reach all injured parties; and the alleged violation of the
transaction is not the source of the harm. Both procedural and
corrective justice constitute important community values -in our
liberal society. And, to the extent that they do, contemporary
receivership rules and practices oppose those values and thereby
cause harm to all.
No doubt it is easier to measure the harm caused to the
lender in contrast to the economic and psychological harm caused to
others. But that facility should not justify a focus upon the former
to the exclusion of the other. The question "does the wrongdoer
cause harm to another" depends upon what counts as harm. That
evaluative question must first be addressed before we examine the
evidence surrounding the harm caused. And that prescriptive
question requires us to ask ourselves, "toward what ends does our
community aspire?" For reasons expressed elsewhere, procedural
justice serves as one such critical end in a liberal society 7 Threats
to such an end constitute harm. The more significant the end, the
85
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For an interesting study showing the importance of understanding "harm" in terms of
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more seriously inadequate is our use of the form of corrective
justice in describing receivership practice. Accordingly, we must
look to Aristotle's second form of substantive justice (distributive
justice) in order to appreciate better the justice issues presupposed
in the receivership rules and practice.
b) Distributivejustice
Distributive justice is a form whereby a given resource is
distributed among competing claimants in accordance with some
criterion of proportionate equality.88 Distributive justice does not
emanate from some particular transaction, as in the case of
corrective justice. Nor does it involve only two claimants. Rather,
there is no transaction and there can be several or many claimants
to distributive justice. What mediates the relationship among
competing claimants is the criterion of proportionate equality of the
resource to be distributed. The resource need not be wealth or
income. The resource may be honour; social status, or safety. Our
present receivership rules assume wealth (assets) and income to be
the sole resources which the community must distribute.
Liberal societies have elaborated complex criteria by which
the community should distribute given resources amongst competing
claimants. Three such criteria are merit, need, and human worth.8 9
Liberal societies have rewarded persons according to one or a
combination of differing criteria in differing social contexts. So, for
example, some rules define merit in terms of aptitude (rewarding
employees with proportionate secondary school or university
education), strength (for example, construction workers or athletes),
skill (athletes), memory, personality (salespersons), effort (scholars),
productivity (profits), blameworthiness (criminal law), originality
(scientists), duration of effort (seniority), income (tax law), and
88 See generally the sources, supra, note 84, especially Greenawalt at 52-62.
89 These criteria of distributive justices are best explained, exemplified, and analyzed in
Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality reprinted in J. Waldron, ed., Theories ofRights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984) 41 and in A.L Meldon, ed., Human Rights (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1970). It was originally published in R.B. Brandt, ed., Social Justice (Englewood
ClifM, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1962) 31.
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capital (capital gains tax and secured creditors). Merit serves as a
criteria of distributive justice whenever we value a human
characteristic that a possessor has himself or herself acquired (rather
than being gifted or born with the characteristic). Other examples
of meritorious characteristics are wit, grace of manner, technical
skill, sincerity, generosity, or courage. We have allocated different
criteria relative to differing enterprises or we have assessed varying
weights to the criteria from enterprise to enterprise. Sometimes, our
conceptions of merit have clashed, and, on such occasions, social
strife has resulted.
Our content to the form of distributive justice has become
more complicated since the Second World War in that need and
human worth have increasingly challenged merit as the criterion for
distributive justice in a liberal society. The criterion of need goes
to equality of benefits, not equality in the allocation of resources.
So, for example, the allocation of several policemen to guard the
Prime Minister ensures him equality in "security of his life and
person," notwithstanding the fact that more resources are allocated
to his protection in contrast to the rest of us. His need, not
necessarily his merit (he may not satisfy many of the criteria of
merit noted above), justifies the extra resources for his protection.
In contrast, human worth proportions resources because human
beings are "ends in themselves," not because they merit or need the
resources. Although we may not merit police protection (as in the
case of the organized crime leader who does not meet the criterion
of, say, originality or productivity), nor need the equal benefit of
police protection (where, for example, the organized crime leader
possesses his own "police" force), our equal human worth may justify
such protection (as well as other constitutional rights). Sometimes,
we can appeal to each of the three criteria of distributive justice
when we deliberate about the allocation of scarce resources. So, for
example, we can arguably ground the welfare system, universal
access to universities, and access to the courts in terms of merit
('without equality of opportunity, we do not have distribution
according to merit"), or need ("minimum shelter, food, income,
intellectual challenge, or effective legal rights are human needs
without which a human being cannot function as a Canadian
citizen"), or human worth ("minimum shelter, food, income,
intellectual development, or effective legal rights without
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discrimination on grounds of sex, et cetera recognize the equal worth
of "humans as humans").
These competing conceptions of proportionate equality
present themselves in the receivership circumstances. We cannot
resolve the clash of criteria without serious thoughtful political
consideration of the competing theories of freedom, democracy, and
the nature of a person himself or herself, and, indeed, the
relationship between culture and nature. We do suggest, however,
that the present receivership rules and practices presuppose that
capital is the grounding of distribution of resources and that the
receivership rules define capital in vulgar, eighteenth-century terms
of capital accumulation. The rules give priority to the capital of the
lender over the productivity, seniority, effort, and income of
employees.
The greater the lender's capital input into the
enterprise, the greater the preference to that lender over other
lenders. The blameworthiness, effort, skill, personality, originality,
length of labour, income, and capital input of the borrower are
deemed irrelevant. Similarly, the preference rules grant preference
to the lender's raw capital contribution over the economic, social,
and psychological needs of employees, the borrower's family, and the
immediate community.
The post-War appeal to the notion of equal human worth,
as evidenced in the plethora of human rights statutes, constitutional
bills of rights, and international covenants has yet to make its entry
into receivership practice - if not the private world generally.
Arbitrary self-preference in terms of raw capital, rather than some
notion of the equal worth of human beings, provides the content to
the form of distributive justice prior, during, and after the call of a
loan. But the very open-endedness of the content of that form calls
into question the lender's arbitrary self-preference. And, precisely
because distributive justice better describes existing contemporary
receivership rules and practice (in contrast to both procedural justice
and corrective justice), the lawyer and scholar alike must assess the
competing political theories in support of the existing criterion of
distributive justice (capital accumulation) embedded within the
receivership rules and practice. The lawyer/scholar in the private
law world must identify competing criteria of distributive justice such
as need, equal human worth, and alternate criteria of merit (such as
productivity, blameworthiness, effort, management skill, or the like).
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And the lawyer/scholar must question whether the political theories
of distributive justice underlying the latter criteria are more in tune
with the ends of a good society.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This essay has been about the appointment of a receiver.
But it has been more than that. We have used that admittedly
narrow area of commercial law practice as a case study of the
private law world more generally.
We have attempted to
demonstrate that very serious public issues emanate from the private
law world. And we have done so by approaching the subject matter
using a methodology which is admittedly unorthodox to legal
practitioners.
Since the Second World War, Canadian judges, reformers,
scholars, and practitioners have criticized legal rules on the basis of
policy. And the notion "policy" has been understood variously as the
community's values, the goals of society, or the preferences of the
individual critic. Lawyers have understood rules and doctrine as
"objective"; policy as "subjective." We have tried to show, in
contrast, how the forms of justice offer a conceptual frame of
reference with which to describe the actual practice (in this case, the
appointment of a receiver) and, second, to analyze the social/moral
shortcomings of that practice.
More particularly, the use of the forms of justice led us to
conclude that we could accurately describe the current doctrine and
practice of receivership neither in terms of procedural justice nor in
terms of corrective justice. Rather, one could describe the practice
only in terms of distributive justice. Having used the forms to
describe the doctrine and practice, we found ourselves in a better
position to identify what questions to ask. If we should wish to
reform or to critique existing practice in the private law world, we
must be capable of identifying competing criteria of distributive
justice. This would provide alternatives to the contemporary, vulgar
criterion of distributive justice encompassing the law and practice of
receivership: namely, capital accumulation. We must also be
capable of identifying the respective theories of the state, the
community, and the person underlying those alternatives. Further,
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we must be capable of translating those alternative criteria and
theories so as to pose the relevant issues and arguments in the
resolution of concrete problems. The forms of justice analysis, we
have argued, trigger a new set of questions which the rules/policy
continuum of legal analysis does not offer. The forms of justice
offer to the lawyer a richer frame of reference with which to
understand and critique the public issues in a private law world.

